The structures and processes established within an Instiution Offering Islamic financial Services (IIFS) for monitoring and evaluating Shariah compliance rely essentially on arrangements internal to the firm. By being incorporated in the institutional structure, a Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) has the advantage of being close to the market. Competent, independent, and empowered to approve new Shariah-conforming instruments, an SSB can enable innovation likely to emerge within the institution. The paper reviews the issues and options facing current arrangements for ensuring Shariah compliance by IIFS. It suggests a framework that draws on internal and external arrangements to the firm and emphasizes market discipline. In issuing its fatwas, an SSB could be guided by standardized contracts and practices that could be harmonized by a self-regulatory professionals' association. A framework with the suggested internal and external features could ensure adequate consistency of interpretation and enhance the enforceability of contracts before civil courts. The review of transactions would mainly be entrusted to internal review units, which would collaborate with external auditors responsible for issuing an annual opinion on whether the institution's activities met its Shariah requirements. This process would be sustained by reputable entities such as rating agencies, stock markets, financial media, and researchers who would channel signals to market players. This framework would enhance public understanding of the requirements of Shariah and lead to a more effective utilization of options available to stakeholders to achieve continuing improvements in Islamic financial services.
List of Abbreviations
Islamic capital markets, mutual funds and insurance services are also developing.
The Governor of the Bahrain Monetary Agency conveyed the sense of the roots of the IIFS when he stated that "Islamic banks have grown primarily by providing services to a captive market, to people who will only deal with a financial institution that strictly adheres to Islamic principles". 4 Conducting activities in accordance with Shariah entails that the institution pledges: i) not to engage in interest-based debt transactions, ii) not to conduct pure financial transactions disconnected from real economic activity, iii) not to participate in transactions where there is exploitation of any party, and iv) not to participate in activities regarded as harmful to society.
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. Initially, IIFS developed without a clear view on the legislative and regulatory framework that would apply to them. 6 However, their conceptual foundations and operational practices derived from the principles outlined above have specific features that pose challenges to regulators and call for solutions beyond the simple extension of existing legislation and regulation applying to institutions offering conventional financial services (ICFS). To that effect, a number of countries have put in place laws and regulations for IIFS, and international bodies have been established to adapt standards applying to conventional financial services and promote harmonization of practices. 5 Shariah is Islamic Law extracted from the Qur'an and Sunna (sayings and deeds of the Prophet). Not to conduct financial transactions disconnected from real economic activity is sometimes referred to as "materiality". A glossary of Arabic terms is provided in Annex I. 6 For example, in some cases the general prudential regime was extended to IIFS without recognizing any specific feature. In other cases, IIFS registered as non-bank commercial businesses. For an introduction to the principles and instruments of Islamic finance as well as regulatory arrangements applying to IIFS, refer to El-Hawary, Grais, and Iqbal (2004) . 7 These include the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), the International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA), the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) and the Liquidity Management Center (LMC). Rather than seeking to replace existing regulation, these bodies propose solutions whenever conventional regulation fails to address the distinctiveness of the Islamic financial industry.
A widely adopted approach is to have independent bodies certify Shariah compliance by the IIFS. The reliance on independent bodies reflects the currently limited role that market discipline can play in ensuring such compliance. Hirschman contended that stakeholders generally have two ways of reacting to performance deterioration in business organizations. 9 The first is for the stakeholder to quit the organization. The other is for the stakeholder to agitate and exert influence for change from within the organization. The potential role that these two mechanisms can play in upholding conformity with Shariah is constrained by the perceived complexity of Islamic financial instruments and their limited "commoditization". The diversity of jurisprudence on permissible transactions, and the limited disclosure of relevant and reliable financial information compound the difficulty. In addition, market participants and other stakeholders are likely to lack sufficient knowledge of Shariah or of financial principles, or of both, to judge the transactions of IIFS. In line with the foregoing, compliance with Shariah is primarily ensured through organs internal to the IIFS. At the same time, a broader enabling institutional environment, sometime referred to as external corporate governance is being put in place.
In the following the paper reviews in section two, prevailing internal arrangements that deal with Shariah compliance in individual IIFS; it examines the CG issues involved, and proposes measures to strengthen their effectiveness. Section three considers external arrangements that complement the ones adopted by individual institutions to promote compliance with the Shariah. The concluding section summarizes the overall strengths and weaknesses of existing arrangements.
II.

Internal CG Arrangements for Shariah Compliance
The approach most widely adopted currently is to establish independent bodies of knowledgeable agents. These bodies are usually internal to the institution and part of its governance structure. They include Shariah Supervisory Boards and Shariah review units. The following first analyzes existing arrangements and then considers options to strengthen them.
A. Internal Arrangements
Each institution offering Islamic financial services has in-house religious advisers, who are collectively known as the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB). 10 In principle, the role of the SSB covers five main areas: certifying permissible financial instruments through fatwas (ex-ante Shariah audit), verifying that transactions comply with issued fatwas (ex-post Shariah audit), calculating and paying Zakat, disposing of non-Shariah compliant earnings, and advising on the distribution of income or expenses among shareholders and investment account holders. 11 The SSB issues a report to certify that all financial transactions comply with the above-mentioned principles. This report is often an integral part of the Annual Report of the Islamic financial institution.
In practice an SSB's tasks may vary according to provisions stipulated in the articles of association of the financial institution or those stipulated by national regulators. A review of 13 IIFS shows that all SSBs were entrusted with ex-ante monitoring and the calculation of Zakat. 12 However, ex-post monitoring was within the exclusive competence of Shariah review units in at least two cases. 13 In another case, the 10 They exist in all Islamic countries with the exception of Iran, where compliance of the whole banking system with Shariah is guaranteed and monitored by the central bank. 11 A Fatwa is a religious edict or proclamation. It is a legal opinion issued by a qualified Muslim scholar on matters of religious belief and practice. The social nature of Islamic finance emerges most clearly in the practices of Zakat and Qard Hassan. Zakat is a tax on wealth, while Qard Hasan refers to zero-return beneficence loans made to the needy. The objective, according to the Meezan Bank of Pakistan is the "implementation of an equitable economic system, providing a strong foundation for establishing a fair and just society for mankind".See also Briston and El-Ashker (1986) and Abdel Karim (1990) . 12 The sample reflects the accessibility of relevant information in these IIFS. Source: annual reports, articles of association, and all information posted on the websites of the In principle, SSB members are required to submit an unbiased opinion in all matters pertaining to their assignment. However, their employment status generates an economic stake in the financial institution, which can negatively impact their independence. The opinions of the SSB may, for example, prohibit the bank engaging in certain profitable transactions or impose a reallocation of illicit income to charity, resulting in a poorer overall financial performance. Under these circumstances, the bank managers may be tempted to use their leverage to influence SSB members, producing what is commonly referred to as "Fatwa shopping" or "Shariah advisory à la carte".
In practice, the risk of such conflict of interest is mitigated by the ethical standards of the SSB members, and the high cost that a stained reputation would inflict on them and on the financial institution. Generally, members of SSBs are highly regarded Shariah scholars and guardians of its principles. Therefore, a less than truthful assessment and disclosure of Shariah compliance by an SSB would seem to be highly unlikely. In the event that it does occur and comes to light, it would seriously damage the concerned scholars' reputation and the prospect for further recourse to their services.
Similarly, managerial interference in compliance assessments can lead to a loss of shareholders' and stakeholders' confidence. Management may be penalized and face dismissal. All that being said, and the heavy costs of untruthful assessments notwithstanding, a potential conflict of interest is inherent in existing corporate arrangements regarding SSBs.
The issue of confidentiality is intertwined with that of independence. Often, some Shariah scholars sit on the SSBs of more than one financial institution. This association with multiple IIFS may be seen as a strength in as much as it could enhance an SSB's independence vis-à-vis a particular institution. However, it does give the particular individual access to proprietary information of other, possibly competing institutions.
Thus SSB members may find themselves in another type of potential conflict of interest.
In the current practice, Malaysia has attempted to deal with this issue by discouraging jurists from sitting on the SSB of more than one IIFS. While this eliminates confidentiality concerns, the practice poses other potential problems. First, it would exacerbate lack of competence where there is a scarcity of Fiqh al-Muamalat jurists. 16 Second, it may prevent the formation of an efficient labor market for Shariah audit, by decreasing the economic appeal of the profession. Lastly, it may create a symbiotic relationship between the auditor and the financial institution that could undermine impartiality.
The third issue relates to the nature of the competence required of SSB members.
Due to the unique role that they are called upon to fulfill, SSB members should ideally be knowledgeable in both Islamic law and commercial and accounting practices (Fiqh alMuamalat) . In practice, it would appear that very few scholars are well-versed in both disciplines. The issue has been addressed by including members from different backgrounds in most SSBs. 17 However, the combination of experts rather than expertise creates the challenge of overcoming different perspectives as well as the risk of potential failure of communication. Over time, the demand gap for combined Shariah and financial skills is likely to be reduced through public policy and normal labor market operations. 19 In reality, however, the diversity of opinions is less widespread than might be expected. The CIBAFI sampled about 6000 fatwas, and found that 90% were consistent across banks. The fact that over one hundred Shariah scholars around the world issued these fatwas would suggest an overall consistency in the interpretation of the sources. 20 Further, this high degree of consistency between the fatwas would also point to a substantial independence of SSBs. Nevertheless, as the industry expands, the number of conflicting fatwas on the permissibility of an instrument is likely to increase. This could undermine customer confidence in the industry and have repercussions on the enforceability of contracts.
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The last and overarching issue relates to disclosure of all information relating to Shariah advisories. In addition to the positive aspects of thus empowering stakeholders, disclosure could be the means to addressing some of the issues discussed in the preceding paragraphs. A transparent financial institution would ideally disclose the duties, decisionmaking process, areas of competence, and the composition of its SSB, as well publish all fatwas issued by the SSB. This would strengthen stakeholders' confidence in the credibility of SSB assessments. In addition, public disclosure of such information would 18 The proportion of advisors to company seems to be quite large. Every management company must appoint at least 3 Shariah advisors for one company. This means that every advisor would serve on the SSBs of about two or more fund management companies. provide a forum for educating the public, thus paving the way for a larger role for market discipline in regard to Shariah compliance. Finally, it would decrease the costs that external agents may face in assessing the quality of internal Shariah supervision.
Despite all these potential benefits, transparency does not currently seem to be widely prevalent. Out of 13 banks reviewed, all declared the existence of an SSB within the organization and disclosed information on its composition. 22 However, only 7 made the annual report of the SSB easily accessible, and 7 did not provide detailed information on the professional background of SSB members. 23 Moreover, only two banks disclosed the fatwas authorizing the provision of financial services and products. Only one disclosed provisions for decision-making and interaction with other bodies of the firm.
Finally, only one institution disclosed on its website the duties and obligations of the SSB. 24 The practice of limited disclosure by banks would not support building confidence 
B. Strengthening Internal Arrangements for Shariah Compliance
The 33 For instance, dismissal of SSBs may only be prompted by a request of the board of directors approved by the general assembly of shareholders. This will prevent "fatwa-shopping". Further, the standards' provisions prohibit the appointment of "directors or significant stakeholders" as SSB members and the prohibition for Shariah review units to carry out operational activities (for instance, a division in the internal audit department). Depending on local circumstances, such provisions may be strengthened by introducing severe sanctions for accepting loans from the audited company, having family relationship with the audit client or having any form of direct or indirect material interest in the business. For instance, in Malaysia, the approval and dismissal of SSBs must be communicated to the central bank. Opponents of this measure abound. Summer (1998) argues that "by destroying rents from an ongoing relation, the rotation rule undermines incentives for building up a reputation of honesty". He therefore suggests that competition in the auditor market may be a better safeguard for auditors' independence. An independent review of the practice by the Bocconi University concluded that rotation compromises audit quality, which strictly depends on a good knowledge of the business and its management. Disclosure of the processes leading to Shariah pronouncements and related information needs to be the cornerstone of Shariah governance. These issues may not have received sufficient attention either from IIFS themselves or their regulators and supervisors. Therefore, policies need to be put in place that would ensure adequate disclosure, terms of both quality and ease of retrieval, such as through IIFS websites and annual reports. Of particular importance would be, inter alia, the SSB annual report and its fatwas. Informing IIFS's stakeholders on the composition, powers, competence and decision-making of SSBs would also enhance the transparency of the processes leading to Shariah pronouncements.
III. External Arrangements for Shariah Compliance
Under the prevailing current decentralized system of Shariah advisory, the flexibility in Fiqh opinions has encouraged innovation in Islamic financial products, contributing significantly to the dynamism of the industry. Nevertheless, because of the very nature of jurisprudence, interpretation of the Shariah by a large number of independent scholars, notably in the various SSBs gives rise to inconsistencies in the fatwas across SSBs, or even over time in the same SSB. Internal systems and procedures could be developed in IIFS to limit inconsistencies and explain different pronouncements.
External arrangements, including mechanisms of market discipline can provide complementary channels inducing compliance with rulings and their harmonization. The following first analyzes existing external arrangements and then considers options to strengthen them.
A. Existing External Arrangements
The broad Shariah governance framework may feature (a) arrangements put in place by regulators, and (b) the presence of providers of financial information services external to the firms. Among regulatory arrangements, centralized SSBs are the most noteworthy. While there are significant differences across countries, centralized SSBs are usually concerned with ex-ante monitoring, mostly understood as standardization of Shariah interpretation, and ex-post monitoring of Shariah compliance. They also offer arbitration to settle Shariah disputes arising between members of the same SSB. In addition, a few countries have set up public rating agencies that assess financial instruments and institutions. These are meant to create a positive climate for Shariah compliant investments. 
B.
Strengthening External Arrangements for Shariah Compliance
Recent literature and practice have focused on establishing external CG structures to ensure effective Shariah audit. In proposing the externalization of Shariah advisory, Chapra and Habib (2002) suggest that chartered audit firms should acquire the necessary knowledge to undertake Shariah audit. This process is already underway as evidenced by the increasing number of independent consulting companies and law firms offering an independent opinion on Shariah compliance. To avoid duplication, the latter function could be performed by Shariah departments set up by existing chartered auditors. (Table III shows how internal and external Shariah review may be differentiated and illustrates the merit of specialization. 
Management
Reports to management administratively. Builds relationships throughout the organization to ensure concerns are identified and resolved in a timely manner.
Primarily reports to the audit committee on financials and internal control.
Board of directors/ Audit Committee
Reports directly to the audit committee. Provides opinions on the organization's business risks, financial statements, system of internal control, and level of compliance with laws, regulations, and policies.
Attests to the audit committee the accuracy of the financial reports and attests on management's assessment on internal controls over financial reporting. Provides updates on pending accounting pronouncements and their potential impact on the organization.
Independence
Should demonstrate organizational independence and objectivity in work approach, but is not independent of the organization. (Is independent of the activity audited, but is integral to the organization.)
It is organizationally and managerially independent of the organization.
Results
Identifies problems, make recommendations, and helps facilitate resolutions.
Meets statutory requirements and provides necessary adjustments to meet financial accuracy.
Risk
Identifies and qualifies key business risks to estimate probability of occurrence and impact on business. Makes appropriate recommendations as a result of the risk assessment.
Identifies key transactions and exposures for financial statements.
Fraud
Includes fraud detection steps in audit programs. Investigates the allegations of fraud. Reviews fraud prevention controls and detection processes put in place by management and makes recommendations for improvement.
Includes fraud detection steps in audit plan. Gathers information necessary to identify risks of material misstatement due to fraud, by inquiring of management and others within the entity about the risks of fraud. Considers the results of the analytical procedures performed in planning the audit and fraud risk factors.
Recommendations
Communicates to management in the audit reports recommendations for corrective action.
Communicates recommendations for corrective action.
*Adapted from table in Richards (2002) .
A framework of co-existing internal and external Shariah audits as described above does not help to resolve the difficulties caused by inconsistencies in the body of fatwas. In an effort to alleviate this problem, some jurisdictions have moved towards a system of centralized SSBs. The latter carry the expectation of harmonization of permissible financial instruments through adjudicating disputes between Shariah advisors and by standardizing existing practices. However, the ongoing globalization of Islamic finance as well as constraints on its applicability in secular countries limits the feasibility of this approach. To circumvent these limitations, Khan and Feddad (2004) recommend the gradual international codification and standardization of fatwas. This duty may be delegated to an existing international organization, whose mission already involves the promotion of harmonization and convergence of Shariah interpretations. 43 Alternatively, a new self-regulating non-profit association of Fiqh al-Muamalat experts may be created.
However, despite its apparent advantages, the creation of a global Shariah regulator is likely to meet with resistance, specifically from jurists who regard Islamic Fiqh as a pluralist body of knowledge. Also, the centralization of competences in a global regulator may undermine product innovation and financial engineering.
44 43 AAOIFI's mission statements declare that "the powers of (AAOIFI's) Shari'a Board include, among others, the following: achieving harmonization and convergence in the concepts and application among the Shari'a supervisory boards of Islamic financial institutions to avoid contradiction or inconsistency between the fatwas and applications by these institutions, thereby providing a pro-active role for the Shari'a supervisory boards of Islamic financial institutions and central banks (…)" Likewise IIFM's "role includes the promotion of harmonization and convergence of Shariah interpretations in developing Islamic banking products and practices that are universally acceptable". Sources: www.aaoifi.com and www.iifm.net/ 44 This would obviously depend on the degree of powers transferred to such an organization. For instance, the State Bank of Pakistan has issued "Essentials of Islamic modes of financing" to ensure compliance with minimum Shariah standards, which do not present an obstacle to innovation and yet contribute to harmonizing permissible contracts. For more www.sbp.org.pk.
Over-reliance on the public sector for regulating Shariah matters may also present other difficulties, such as the reluctance of authorities in a large number of jurisdictions, to be involved in what they would consider private religious matters. In such situations, the private sector could fill the gap and play a more decisive role in the Shariah compliance process. The focus would be on consolidating the Shariah related information infrastructure by creating new processes or strengthening the exiting infrastructure. Next to external Shariah audit firms, representational agents that normally channel financial information to the public may acquire new skills and assess IIFS's compliance with Islamic finance rules.
In the future, key players in this field may be the private rating agencies. One may anticipate that they would gradually develop skills to evaluate Shariah compliance and make this information readily available to investors using their existing dissemination infrastructure. Their coverage may also include companies in which IIFS have a stake.
This would create a positive climate for Shariah compliant investments, particularly for partnership and venture capital transactions. It is noteworthy that some leading rating companies have included "religious supervision" as an item in their reports on IIFS. 
Section IV. Conclusion
Overall, current practice to ensure Shariah compliance relies essentially on internal corporate structures, in particular SSBs. These certainly offer stakeholders a level of comfort. Nevertheless, they face a number of challenges relating to their independence, the confidentiality of institution-specific proprietary information, the limited availability of professionals with both Shariah scholarship and financial skills, and the need for consistency in pronouncements between the various SSBs. A few jurisdictions have tried to address some of these issues by introducing an external institutional infrastructure. This, however, creates potential difficulties arising out of inconsistent pronouncements for IIFS groups operating in different jurisdictions, and may be problematic for regulators in non-Islamic countries. Market solutions to offer services that would promote Shariah compliance are still minimal. Such a framework can be instrumental in enhancing stakeholders' confidence. It would enable innovation that can generally be expected to emerge mainly within the firm, where a sufficiently competent and independent SSB would be empowered to approve new Shariah conforming instruments. In issuing its fatwas, the SSB can be guided by standardized contracts and practices consistent with principles emerging from external arrangements, notably from international standard-setting official or self-regulatory bodies. The review of transactions would mainly be entrusted to internal review units, which would collaborate with external auditors, responsible for issuing an annual opinion on whether the IIFS activities meet its Shariah requirements. This process would be sustained by reputable agents, like rating agencies, stock markets, financial media, and researchers who would channel signals to market players. Such a framework including structures and processes internal and external to the IIFS can be expected to enhance public understanding of the requirements of Shariah. It would be conducive to the development of market discipline as it would permit an effective utilization of exit and participatory actions. A party pays another a specified amount of money as a fee for rendering a specific service in accordance to the terms of the contract stipulated between the two parties. This mode usually applies to transactions such as consultations and professional services, fund placements and trust services.
Annex I: Glossary of Arabic Terms
Kifala
It is a pledge given to a creditor that the debtor will pay the debt, fine, or liability. A third party becomes surety for the payment of the debt if unpaid by the person originally liable.
Mudaraba (Trustee finance contract)
Rabb -al-mal (capital's owner) provides the entire capital needed to finance a project while the entrepreneur offers his labor and expertise. Profits are shared between them at a certain fixed ratio, whereas financial losses are exclusively borne by rabb-al-mal. The liability of the entrepreneur is limited only to his time and effort. Murabaha (Mark-up financing)
The seller informs the buyer of his cost of acquiring or producing a specified product. The profit margin is then negotiated between them. The total cost is usually paid in installments.
Musharaka (Equity participation)
The bank enters into an equity partnership agreement with one or more partners to jointly finance an investment project. Profits (and losses) are shared strictly in relation to the respective capital contributions.
Qard Hassan (Beneficence loans)
These are zero-return loans that the Qur'an encourages Muslims to make to the needy. Banks are allowed to charge borrowers a service fee to cover the administrative expenses of handling the loan. The fee should not be related to the loan amount or maturity.
Quran
Islamic scriptures believed by Muslims to be God's revelation to the Prophet.
Riba'
Literally, an excess or increase. Technically, an increase, which in a loan transaction or in exchange of a commodity, accrues to the owner (lender) without giving an equivalent counter value or recompense in return to the other party.
The Islamic Law extracted from the Qur'an and Sunna (sayings and deeds of the Prophet).
Sunna
Deeds of the Prophet.
Takaful
Arabic name for insurance based on Shariah rules. An Islamic Insurance is a collective protection scheme. It literally means solidarity. Takaful reflects solidarity and is akin to mutual insurance.
Umma
Community of the faithful within Islam Wadiah A safe custody contract between the depositor (customer) and the custodian (bank).
Wikala
An Agency contract which may include in its terms a fee for the agent. Same contract can also be used to give a power of attorney to someone to represent another's interests.
Zakat
Religious tax to be deducted from wealth to be paid to the needy.
Compiled from El-Hawary, Grais, and Iqbal (2004) and the glossary of the IIFM website (www.iifm.net). 
Annex II: Mission statements of IIFS and ICFS
IIFS
Bank Muamalat Berhad, Malaysia
To build the bank into a modern, dynamic and strong Islamic Bank that would play a role in providing a viable alternative to the conventional system, that will contribute to the development of Modern Malaysia.
Commonwealth Bank, Australia
The key financial objective of the Bank is to have Total Shareholder Return in the top quartile of our Australian listed peers over each rolling five year period.
BadrForte bank, Russia
To contribute to the globalization of Islamic Banking as the principal institution within the Russian Federation implementing Islamic financial and economic concepts, which offer a unique solution for social justice and harmony in our contemporary society
BBVA Group, Spain
The seven corporate principles are as follows: Focus on the customer as the centre of business; creation of shareholder value through business activity; teamwork as the engine in the creation of value; a management style that generates enthusiasm; ethical behavior and personal integrity as a way of understanding and conducting business; innovation as the engine of progress; and corporate social responsibility as an intrinsic part of development. Our objective is to provide our shareholders with a satisfactory long-term return on their investment. Thus, the aim is for Jyske Bank every year to be one of the top-performing Danish banks based on the level of our earnings. Jyske Bank is thus an excellent choice for shareholders who want to make a long-term investment and who do not attach great importance to decisions which generate only short-term price increases.
AlBaraka
Islamic
Bank of Thailand, Thailand
(The bank's goals are): to maintain the role of a bank that is not tied up with interest; to strengthen the business; to carry out social and organizational stability; to provide an excellent service; and to well direct and supervise the community development
RHB Group, Malaysia
Mission: To become the most admired Malaysian financial services company by providing excellent customer services, enhancing shareholder value, providing challenging career and learning opportunities for employees, demonstrating responsibility for society.
ABC Islamic Bank (E.C.)
Our mission is to uphold our carefully formulated Islamic principles in the quest for mutual prosperity for our clients and the Bank. In pursuit of our mission, we commit the Bank to the purest forms of Islamic banking products and services from a HSBC Canada, Canada HSBC in Canada is committed to being Canada's leading international financial services organization, a leader in chosen markets, and recognized by its clients as proactive, responsive, competitive and secure. To achieve a superior long term Shari'a perspective. We remain demonstrably independent from the conventional sector and recognize the importance of Islam's social objectives in conducting business. We are committed to delivering a level of service that matches, or exceeds, the market practice internationally. To do so, we seek to employ the best available human resources and the technology to apply the highest professional, moral and ethical standards.
return for our shareholder we will efficiently deliver a differentiated client experience which reflects our commitment to excellence in sales, service and products, and which is delivered by highly motivated and well qualified employees, working as a team. Through managing for value, HSBC in Canada is committed to making a world of difference to its clients, employees, communities and shareholders
Meezan Bank Limited, Pakistan
Establish Islamic banking as banking of first choice to facilitate the implementation of an equitable economic system, providing a strong foundation for establishing a fair and just society for mankind. To be a premier Islamic bank, offering a one-stop shop for innovative value added products and services to our customers within the bounds of Shariah, while optimizing the stakeholders' value through an organizational culture based on learning, fairness, respect for individual enterprise and performance.(website)
Barclays
Group, UK
Barclays aims to be one of the most admired financial services organizations in the world; in the eyes of our shareholders, our customers, our colleagues and the communities in which we work.
The best measure of our long term performance is the total return we give to our shareholders -the increase in the price of our shares, assuming that any dividends are used to buy more shares, known as 'Total Shareholder Return'. 
Desirable disclosure
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 *The 6 indexes are calculated by attributing a 1 to every item that is disclosed and a 0 to items that are not disclosed by the 13 IIFS specified in footnote 54, in information venues such as annual reports and websites. The average across IIFS for every item is then taken to calculate the effective disclosure index. The desirable disclosure index is 1 assuming that ideally every IIFS in the sample ought to disclose information on Shariah Governance processes and structures. ** Two IIFS had never issued a SSB report due to their recent establishment. Nevertheless, the items are counted as disclosed due to the IIFS overall high level of disclosure 
Shariah Governance Disclosure Indexes
Effective Disclosure Index 
